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Abstract and Keywords 
 
In the daily work of criminal justice, the relationship between plea decision-making and 
sentencing is important. Meanwhile in the academic and policy literatures, it is one of the 
most controversial. This essay appraises the international empirical literature and the 
moral arguments surrounding this plea-dependent (guilty/not guilty) “sentence 
differential.” Sentence differential is the morally neutral term used here to denote 
practices variously termed as “sentence discount,” “trial tax/penalty,” “guilty plea 
discount/reduction,” and “sentence bargain/negotiation.” Section II analyzes whether the 
sentence differential undermines the presumption of innocence. Section III investigates 
whether the sentence differential violates legal equality. Section IV assesses the three 
main justifications for the differential. Section V scrutinizes measurement of the sentence 
differential. Section VI proposes an agenda for future research, including the need for 
deeper research into the experiences of and interpretations by defendants of the justice 
process. 
 
Keywords: sentencing, sentence discount, sentence reduction, trial penalty, trial tax, plea bargaining, negotiated 
justice, guilty plea, not guilty plea 
Introduction 
 
In the daily work of the criminal justice process, the relationship between plea decision-
making and sentencing is one of the most important. Meanwhile, in the academic and 
policy literatures it is one of the most controversial. This essay examines the moral 
arguments for and against the practice of altering a sentence as a consequence of a plea 
of “not guilty” or “guilty”. It also appraises the state of international empirical 
knowledge about the practice and raises questions for future research.  
It is widely believed that a defendant who pleads guilty is likely to receive a reduced 
sentence if s/he pleads ‘guilty’ than if s/he is found guilty, as a result of a trial, of exactly 
the same charges. Various terms are used to describe this practice (e.g. “Sentence 
Reduction”, “Guilty Plea Discount”, “Sentence Deduction”, “allowance in respect of a 
guilty plea”, “Trial Penalty”, et cetera.). However, as discussed below, these terms are 
value laden and imply different normative positions. Thus, in the interests of neutrality, 
this essay will generally use the term “Plea-Dependent Sentence Differential” (or 
“Sentence Differential” for short). The foundation for the Sentence Differential varies 
depending on the jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions statue or case law may permit, or 
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even require, a Sentence Differential. In others the basis of the Sentence Differential is 
found in guideline schemes. In certain jurisdictions the Sentence Differential may have 
little formal basis and is routed in the informal practices of sentencers. However, 
regardless of its basis, in most criminal justice systems there is a widely held perception 
that there is a Sentence Differential. This essay will provide an overview of the main 
issues and debates resulting from the Sentence Differential. In doing so, it also raises 
some provocative questions and suggestions for future research, not least the pressing 
need for a fuller appreciation of   defendants’ perspectives and decision-making.  
Yet, before going further it is worth clarifying some preliminary matters. While 
procedures vary between jurisdictions, in general there are two broad ways through 
which a Sentence Differential may result. The first way is direct. It involves the judge 
altering the sentence on the basis of the plea entered. Alternatively, a Sentence 
Differential can occur indirectly. For example, there may be other Plea Bargaining 
practices such as “Charge Bargaining” where an agreement is reached that charges will 
be amended in return for a guilty plea. These practices are indirect because they do not 
directly concern the sentence. However, often the defendant will hope that they lead to a 
reduced (“discounted”) sentence. For clarity, while there is some crossover (not least 
since they are both forms of Plea Bargaining), this essay mainly focuses on the direct 
ways a Sentence Differential can occur. Additionally, it is worth clarifying that this essay 
focuses mainly on adversarial legal systems. This is not to imply that the broad idea of 
the Sentence Differential is completely alien to inquisitorial systems. In the past it has 
been asserted that inquisitorial justice systems, such as those in continental Europe, did 
not engage in any settlement practices which bore any functional resemblance to Plea 
Bargaining (for example, see Langbein 1979). While it is true that typically such systems 
cannot engage in Plea Bargaining, as there are no “pleas” and all cases go to trial, 
defendants can (and do) make “confessions” or “admissions” of guilt that are 
“rewarded”.1 These practices amount to what some have argued is a functional 
                                                 
 
1 Care must be taken when generalizing a diverse range of justice systems based on 
whether or not they are Inquisitorial. While this is done here for simplicity caution 
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equivalent to Plea Bargaining in inquisitorial justice systems (see Thaman 2010 for an 
overview). 
The essay is organised as follows. Section I explores the concern that a Sentence 
Differential violates the presumption of innocence. It explores the criticism that the 
Sentence Differential operates to penalise those who continue to plead not guilty by 
imposing (or threatening to impose) a higher sentence than if they plead guilty. Section 
II explores the criticism that the Sentence Differential may have disparate impacts on 
different groups (specifically minorities and those who are socially and economically 
disadvantaged). Section III explores why, in light of the dangers to principled sentencing 
and Liberal Rule of Law values, justice systems apparently continue to persist with 
Guilty Plea Discounts. Penultimately, Section IV questions the state of empirical 
knowledge regarding the Sentence Differential. Finally, Section V highlights some 
further questions which future research should explore. 
I. Does the Sentence Differential Violate the Presumption of 
Innocence? 
 
In Anglo-American justice systems the Sentence Differential is widely considered to be a 
“sentence discount” or “reduction” that rewards a Guilty Plea. However, this view is not 
universal. For instance, Fiona Leverick acknowledges that there is a “principled 
objection” (Leverick 2004, p.382) to be made against Guilty Plea Discounts as they 
amount to a punishment for those accused who exercise their right to trial. Similarly, 
Penny Darbyshire is critical of the argument that Guilty Plea Discounts are indeed 
“discounts”: 
The discount undeniably punishes those who exercise their right to trial then are 
found guilty, however much the Court of Appeal tries to disguise a Sentence 
Discount as a reward for remorse. This is stunning hypocrisy in the Anglo-American 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
should be exercised: especially as some inquisitorial systems may now have elements 
that could be traditionally considered as adversarial and vice versa. 
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legal systems, whose rhetoric trumpets the right to trial, especially jury trial, the 
burden of proof and the presumption of innocence as the hallmarks of the world's 
finest democracies. (Darbyshire 2000, p.901) 
 
Those who consider the Sentence Differential as a violation of the right to be presumed 
innocent sometimes refer to it as a “Trial Tax” or “Trial Penalty”. Consequently, terms 
such as “discount” and “penalty” are value-laden and connote a very different opinion 
(which is why the more neutral term “Sentence Differential” is used here). The values 
reflected in these terms are important as they relate to a central tenant of the Liberal 
Rule of Law: its suspicion of the state and its desire to protect individuals from its 
power. It is these values that have helped form an ideological foundation for the 
presumption of innocence. By potentially inducing guilty pleas, which bypass the trial 
and arguably undermine the presumption of innocence, a fundamental criticism can be 
made of the Sentence Differential. Some have gone further and suggested that large 
Sentence Differentials can be coercive (Caldwell 2011; Ashworth 2006: 256-7; McCoy 
2005). For example, McCoy (2005:90) argues that the magnitude of the trial penalty is 
so severe that we must ask “whether it amounts to institutionalized coercion”. She 
argues that:  
Implicit plea bargains occur for two reasons: (1) the defendant knows the "going 
rate" of punishment and can accept it, and (2) for some defendants who believe they 
have valid legal defences, the threat of trial penalty will cause them to plead guilty 
anyway. There is nothing wrong with pleading guilty in the expectation of receiving 
a "going rate" of punishment. But […] there is a lot wrong with pleading guilty if 
that going rate after trial is so huge as to be the reason a defendant will make a 
pre-emptive guilty plea. McCoy 2005: 94, emphasis added)2 
                                                 
 
2 Quite how large the sentence differential (or “trial penalty”) can be before it becomes 
‘coercive’ is a matter for debate and one to which there is probably no objective 
quantifiable answer. Like Appeal Courts, reformers have wrestled with the question of ‘how 
large a percentage difference is too large?’  While the question of magnitude is extremely 
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Thus, two issues can be identified. The first is that the infringement on the presumption 
of innocence is wrong in principle, even if the defendant is guilty: the guilty are entitled 
to be presumed innocent and put the state to proof. The second issue is whether the 
Sentence Differential can potentially induce innocent defendants to plead guilty, thus 
resulting in wrongful convictions. 
To some the second issue might seem far-fetched. It might be supposed that the risk of 
defendants incriminating themselves by pleading guilty to charges of which they are 
innocent is merely hypothetical. Surely, the supposition runs, no sane person would 
plead guilty to something they have not done: defendants choose rationally and freely 
how to plead. Moreover, it may be expected that this would not happen because 
defendants are represented by skilled lawyers fearlessly representing the best interests 
of their clients and holding steadfastly to cherished values such as the presumption of 
innocence. However, while this may be true of some defendants, there is evidence that 
the Sentence Differential may contribute to innocent defendants pleading guilty 
(Garrett 2011). Why this might occur in any individual case is a complex questions, but 
in general there are at least five reasons to doubt the supposition that it is implausible 
that defendants do not plead guilty to charges of which they may not be guilty.  
First, the literature on the relationship between criminal defence lawyers and their 
clients shows clearly that while in theory defendants “instruct” their lawyers, the reality 
is more complex. Empirical research “has consistently highlighted the relative passivity 
of most clients” (Tata and Stephen 2006:732, see also Carlen 1976, McConville et al 
1994; Ericson and Baranek 1982). While in most contexts the professional-client 
relationship is characterized by an inequality of power, this is especially acute in the 
context of most criminal cases. The weak educational, social and personal resources of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
important, we should also bear in mind that the defendant’s perception is what determines 
his/her pleading decisions. The belief of the defendant about the likely sentence 
differentials is understood within the wider context about a range of other criminal justice 
process costs (not least, for example, being held on remand) and a range of personal 
circumstances.  
 
C Tata and J Gormley (2016) ‘Sentencing and Plea Bargaining: Guilty Pleas Versus Trial 
Verdicts’ in  Criminology and Criminal Justice, Criminal Courts and Prosecutors (Oxford 
Handbooks online, Oxford University Press). Pre-publication Proof version. 
 
 
 6 
most (though not all) defendants can severely limit defendants’ agency. Additionally, 
these issues can be exacerbated by the immediate stress and anxiety of being subject to 
criminal charges (especially while held in pre-trial detention); the unfamiliar vernacular 
of the legal system; and the requirements of criminal and court procedures (which can 
vary by court in some jurisdictions). As a result it can be difficult for clients to take firm 
command of their own cases. Indeed, all this means that defendants may not always 
fully understand the charges against them, and some may even plead guilty to charges 
they do not fully understand. Research is urgently needed to explore more fully what 
defendants do and do not understand, but there is reason to question assumptions that 
guilty pleas are always fully informed  
Secondly, research has shown that the criminal process in the lower and intermediate 
courts tends to be characterized by a gearing towards Guilty Pleas. There is a 
widespread expectation among court personnel that an admission of guilt by the 
defendant is inevitable (e.g. McBarnet 1981; Carlen; Feeley 1982; Heumann 1978; Tata 
2007; 2010). This expectation can become self-perpetuating in very practical ways. For 
example, court schedules depend on a high volume of guilty pleas to assist expeditious 
processing of cases.  
Thirdly, while lawyers may endeavor to look after the best interests of their clients, it is 
now well established that lawyers also have to be cognizant of a range of potentially 
competing imperatives, including longer term inter- and intra-professional 
relationships (e.g. Eisenstein and Jacob 1977; Heumann 1978; Tata 2007) as well as the 
structuring of financial interests (Tata 2007). This is not to say that dedicated people 
such as lawyers simply discard cherished values for career or financial gain: lawyer 
behavior appears to be more complex than this. It is, however, fair to say that there are 
a range of competing dynamics which they have to find some way to resolve and which 
therefore have a bearing on client plea decision-making (Tata 2007).  
Fourthly, some defendants, even where they do not accept the prosecution case, feel 
unable to challenge it effectively. For example, defendants may be charged with an 
allegation when they were under the influence of alcohol or drugs and may have only a 
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hazy memory of events so making them less willing to deny the charges (Tata 2010). 
Others may not trust the system or feel their denial of guilty is unlikely to be believed.  
Fifthly, defendants may make a deliberate choice to plead guilty to charges of which 
they are not guilty. Prima facia this would seem to conflict with theories of decision-
making that posit the defendant as a rational actor who would not wish to incriminate 
him/herself.  However, some defendants may feel obliged to plead guilty so that another 
family member, friend, or gang-member avoids conviction. Other defendants may 
distrust the criminal justice system and doubt that the court will believe their denial 
and so conclude that a plea of guilty is the least bad option. Indeed, pleading guilty, even 
when innocent, can be considered a better option due to the costs which the criminal 
process inflicts (Feeley 1982). For example, Albert Alschuler has noted that:  
A misdemeanor defendant, even if innocent, usually is well advised to…plead guilty 
at the earliest opportunity…to minimize the painful consequences of criminal 
proceedings (Alschuler 1983, p.953). 
 
This is especially true where the defendant is held in pre-trial detention (remand) and 
the sentence could be back-dated to cover, wholly or in part, time served, or where the 
defendant is held in remand but the potential sentence is non-custodial. In both cases, 
the effect of a guilty plea can be immediate liberation. Additionally, the difference in the 
potential punishment if an accused goes to trial can be exorbitant. For example, an 
accused may face different charges if going to trial and these could have a much higher 
minimum sentence – such as has occurred where going to trial means being charged 
under a “three-strikes” law. In such circumstances, where there is not just a perceived 
trial tax but a perception of a sizable trial tax, an individual may feel coerced and/or 
choose to plead guilty even if they are innocent and the chances of acquittal are 
relatively high: paying a small but certain cost to avoid the risk of a contingent but 
larger cost if convicted following a trial. From the perspective of such defendants this is 
a meaningful choice. Additionally, in considering what an accused may choose to do it is 
important to recognize that the decision as to how to plead is not only shaped by the 
relative strength of the charges, but by other “extra-legal” factors including pressing 
social and family considerations. 
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Is the Sentence Differential a “Discount” or a “Trial Penalty / Tax”? 
 
It might be argued that in practice the distinction between a “discount” for pleading 
guilty and a “penalty” for conviction at trial is semantic. Both views are based on the 
same facts, and regardless of whether it argued to be the former or the latter the 
defendant still suffers the same fate (Leverick 2004, p.383). However, as suggested 
above, the distinction raises issues of principle crucial to any criminal system that 
claims to be just. Consequently, this difficult question needs to be tackled.  
So how should the Sentence Differential be characterised? Much depends upon what 
one sees as the “default” or “baseline sentence”. Terms such as “reduction” and 
“discount” imply that the “baseline sentence” is that which would have been passed if 
the accused pled not guilty and was convicted at trial of the same charges. Thus, from 
this perspective, the post-trial sentence is taken as the baseline sentence and the 
Sentence Differential considered as a discount that is deducted from that baseline 
sentence. Indeed, this perspective seems logical and in line with everyday notions of 
discounts: the baseline sentence is the equivalent of a “Recommended Retail Price”, and 
if less is paid then a saving appears to have been made. 
However, not all agree with the above supposition that the post-trial sentence should be 
considered to be the baseline in practice. To continue the analogy, if most of sales are in 
fact concluded at less than the Recommended Retail Price, because it is perpetually 
“discounted”, is the consumer really getting a “discount”, or has the baseline price been 
inflated to give only the appearance of a “discount”? Lynch has argued that: 
In a system where ninety percent or more of cases end in a negotiated disposition, 
it is unclear why the "discounted" punishment imposed in that ninety percent of 
cases should not rather be considered the norm (Lynch 2003, p.1401). 
 
While this issue has plagued some regulatory bodies that aim to ensure consumers are 
protected, no definitive resolution has been found regarding when the “discounted 
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price” becomes the baseline. Interestingly, the possibility that the baseline sentence 
may change has been considered before in England and Wales. In one instance 
sentencing guidelines were locally modified to assume a timely guilty plea, with the 
sentence in effect increasing where there was a late guilty plea or no guilty plea 
(Henham 2000, p.439). Using guidelines in this way was normatively troubling as it 
came closer than before to accepting formally that the Sentence Differential is in reality 
a penalty for going to trial. However, while this potentially exposed the Sentence 
Differential, and the justice system, to criticism it did have advantages.  
One notable advantage is that this approach could be considered more straightforward 
and practical. The usual alternative is a guideline or norm based on a first time offender 
who is convicted following a trial. However, in most jurisdictions this is far from typical. 
For example, it has been noted that in England and Wales only 12 percent of offenders 
plead not guilty, “and only 10% appeared for sentencing without any prior convictions” 
(Ashworth and Roberts 2013, p.7). Consequently, the percentage of those sentenced 
that meet both these conditions is “obviously much smaller than 10%” (Ashworth and 
Roberts 2013, p.7). Thus, a criticism can be made of guidelines and norms that do not 
match the typical reality of most cases.  
However, despite this, viewing the Sentence Differential as a discount is not unfounded 
(certainly it is by far the most common perspective in law), but it is highly questionable. 
Perhaps in the past when trials were shorter, in England it was once normal for a single 
judge to hear between 12-20 cases a day, and guilty pleas uncommon (Alschuler (1979), 
p.9) it may have been less controversial to consider the Sentence Differential a discount. 
However, given that sentences following a guilty plea now account for over 90% of all 
sentences in adversarial systems this argument has become more tenuous. Yet, while 
this challenges the notion that the Sentence Differential is a discount, ultimately it may 
be impossible to settle on an objective answer to the question. Discounts and penalties, 
like notions of “gain” and “loss”, “are malleable concepts” (Bibas (2004), p.2512). This 
means there may always be room for different views. Consequently, what may matter 
more, and perhaps be the question that should be asked, is what the defendant believes 
the Sentence Differential to be. While there is a growing interest in “user perspectives” 
C Tata and J Gormley (2016) ‘Sentencing and Plea Bargaining: Guilty Pleas Versus Trial 
Verdicts’ in  Criminology and Criminal Justice, Criminal Courts and Prosecutors (Oxford 
Handbooks online, Oxford University Press). Pre-publication Proof version. 
 
 
 10 
of the justice system generally, so far there is only limited knowledge about defendant 
perspectives – a situation which we argue later needs urgently to be addressed. 
 
 
II. Do Plea-Dependent Sentence Differentials Violate Legal Equality? 
 
One criticism of Sentence Differentials is that they may have a disproportionally 
negative effect on some minority groups: thereby making the practice indirectly 
discriminatory and undermining the principle of legal equality. However, identifying 
indirectly discriminatory practices is a challenging task as “a wide variety of practices 
that are facially neutral… have racially disparate effects” (Tonry 2012, p.87). For 
example, drug laws penalising the use of crack cocaine one hundred times more 
severely than powdered cocaine seem prima facia racially neutral. However, if one 
group is more likely to use the heavily penalised drug then these laws can have a 
disparate impact (Tonry (2011), p.1).  
One possible way the Sentence Differential may indirectly discriminate against 
minorities is if, for example, “black defendants are in a worse bargaining position than 
white ones, and that this differential bargaining power makes black defendants more 
likely to make worse bargains than similarly situated white defendants” (Savitsky 2012, 
p.135). However, it also possible that inequality could result if minority groups are less 
likely to plead guilty. Indeed, Henham noted that:  
Research suggests that the fact ethnic minority offenders were more likely to 
contest the charges against them inadvertently subjected them to a form of indirect 
discrimination since the system encouraged sentence discounts for guilty pleas. 
(Henham 2001, p. 4). 
 
One factor that may influence whether a defendant pleads guilty or contests the charges 
is their level trust in the justice system and in legal actors. This is problematic as there 
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is evidence that certain ethnic minority groups have less faith in the criminal justice 
system than majority groups (e.g. Shute, Hood and Seemungal 2005). Such mistrust may 
be demonstrated by the higher proportion of black defendants in England who plead 
not guilty and choose to contest their case before a jury of their peers, rather than by a 
judge sitting alone (Hood 1992, p.196; Thomas (2010), pp.21). Furthermore, Michael 
Tonry has noted that “black defendants less often plead guilty and when they do, they 
do it later” (Tonry 2012, p.75). 
These apparent differences in inter-group pleading behaviors are extremely significant 
in justice systems where pleading decisions may dramatically affect sentences. For 
example, if a “Guilty Plea Discount” is one third then by not pleading guilty a defendant’s 
sentence will be 50 percent higher than a comparable defendant who pleads guilty. 
Indeed, Hood’s study suggested that pleading not guilty accounted for 13 percent of the 
total difference “in the black male general population and their proportion among those 
serving sentences” (Hood 1992, p.203).3 Thus, lower levels of trust may mean that 
Guilty Plea Discounts indirectly contribute to racial disparities in criminal justice 
systems.  
Why some minorities may have lower levels of trust is a complex question largely 
beyond the scope of this essay. However, one factor may be that some groups are more 
likely to feel victimized by agents of the criminal justice system. For example, minority 
groups may be targeted in various ways, such as through “racial profiling” (Tator and 
Henry 2006; Welch 2007). The result of this is that, “put into a single sentence: young 
black men [and others] who believe themselves unfairly treated by the police 
understandably become angry and uncooperative, and are punished more severely as a 
result” (Tonry, 2012, p.74). 
However, ultimately, understanding and empirically testing the potentially 
discriminatory effects of the Sentence Differential is not easy. There are many variables 
                                                 
 
3 If anything the plea-dependent sentencing differential may have increased since the 
time of Hood’s study (Sentencing Council 2014 Table 4.2) 
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to consider (e.g. intersectionality between race, class and gender)4 and information is 
limited: particularly regarding defendants subjective perceptions and how these 
influence pleading decisions. Though, for now it seems safe to suggest that, while 
ostensibly neutral, the Sentence Differential may produce “harsher punishments” for 
black and ethnic minority defendants (Tonry 2012, p.87). Unfortunately, while there 
has been recognition of the problem of indirect discrimination, no solution is 
forthcoming. Some jurisdictions have attempted to limit judicial discretion in 
sentencing in the hope that this will reduce the potential for racial disparity: for 
example, this was supposed to be one advantage of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 
the USA (Spohn 2008). However, such attempts to limit discretion have not been 
entirely successful. Firstly, if the content of guidelines is itself indirectly discriminatory 
then little can be achieved. Secondly, while sentencing guidelines may limit discretion to 
some extent, this discretion may be displaced rather than eliminated (Baldwin and 
Hawkins 1984, p.582). Indeed, one potential consequence of reduced judicial discretion 
can be increased prosecutorial discretion. This may be problematic as ‘prosecutorial 
discretion may be more erratic and harder to contain than judicial discretion’ (Provine 
1998, p.831).  
Consequently, without removing the Sentence Differential altogether, there is no clear 
way to prevent its potentially disparate impacts. However, it may be argued that the 
disparate effects of Sentence Differentials are not the problem but the symptom of a 
problem. For example, might the fundamental issue be related to why certain groups 
may mistrust the justice system, rather than how this mistrust manifests to their 
disadvantage? If this is correct, and the disparate impact of the Sentence Differential is 
the symptom, then even if Sentence Differentials were abolished the underlying 
systemic causes of the disparate impact would remain. However, regardless, this is yet 
                                                 
 
4 For example, racial discrimination may combine with other categories of 
discrimination. Indeed, it may operate through socio-economic inequality which liberal 
rule of law societies find particularly difficult to recognise.  
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another reason for more research into defendants’ perceptions about the Sentence 
Differential and wider criminal process within the context of their lived experience. 
 
 
 
 
III. How is the Sentence Differential Justified?  
 
So far this essay has discussed a number of criticisms relating to the Sentence 
Differential: that it undermines the presumption of innocence, may have a racially 
disparate impact, et cetera. Given these issues it could be wondered why the Sentence 
Differential is tolerated, or sometimes encouraged. Three main rationales are advanced 
to justify the Sentence Differential.  
The first rationale is the Remorse Rationale. This supposes that guilty pleas 
demonstrate remorse and that this remorse warrants the reduction. The second 
rationale is the Victim Rationale. This supposes that reductions are justified on the basis 
that the guilty pleas spare victims from the further ordeal of a trial. Finally, the essay 
considers the Efficiency Rationale. This supposes that reductions are justified as they 
induce guilty pleas, or at least earlier guilty pleas, thereby saving resources such as 
court time and money. 
 
A. The Remorse Rationale 
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Using remorse to justify Sentence Discounting relies on the presupposition that a 
contrite offender is less deserving of punishment, or that the contrite offender is more 
worthy of mercy.9 It also relies on the assumption that the guilty plea is a sign of 
remorse. However, there are problems with this rationale in both practice and theory. 
The first problem lies in identifying genuine remorse. The second problem is explaining 
why, all things being equal, remorse justifies a lesser sentence. These are dealt with in 
turn. 
Perhaps the biggest problem with the Remorse Rationale is that identifying genuine 
remorse is difficult (e.g. Bandes 2016; Leverick 2004, pp.370-372). It might be assumed 
that the guilty plea itself is evidence of remorse. Ironically, however, the perception of a 
Sentence Differential means that this argument is weak. As long as defendants perceive 
that they can benefit from a guilty plea it cannot be known whether a guilty plea 
evidences remorse, a tactical decision to try to benefit from a discount, or both. 
Additionally, even if the Sentence Differential were not a factor there are many other 
reasons why a defendant might plead guilty (e.g. to avoid the stress and uncertainty of a 
trial, to be liberated from pre-trial detention, et cetera). This difficulty in distinguishing 
remorse from tactical maneuvering may be a reason not to rely on it is as a basis for 
granting Guilty Plea Discounts. There is a risk that some defendants tendering guilty 
pleas for tactical reasons will be thought remorseful and benefit from a discount, while 
some pleading guilty because of genuine remorse will be thought disingenuous and not 
benefit. If this were the happen it would be far from fair. 
Aside from the difficulty identifying remorse it can be asked why remorse should justify 
a reduction in sentence. Hannah Maslen and Julian V. Roberts argue that, “desert theory 
provides the primary theoretical basis for sentencing guidance” (Maslen and Roberts 
2013, p.125). If this is correct the remorse rationale is questionable as it does not affect 
culpability or harm: remorse occurs after the fact of the offence (Leverick 2004, 
                                                 
 
9 See, for example, Murphy (2005), for a discussion of the link between mercy and 
contrition. 
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p.370).10 Thus, considering remorse does not affect what the defendant did nor how 
blameworthy they were11 it is hard to find a principled reason to explain why such a 
defendant should benefit from a reduction in sentence. Indeed, as suggested above, the 
Sentence Differential may undermine principled sentencing. 
However, despite the normative problems that rewarding defendants for remorse 
creates, there appears to be some public support for the idea that remorse is important 
and that it can provide an acceptable reason for a reduced sentence (Maslen and 
Roberts 2013, p.124). Remorse can also be an important factor for policy makers as 
well. For example, in Scandinavia reductions for admissions have been “rationalized in 
terms of contrition or acceptance of responsibility” (Tonry and Lappi-Seppälä 2011, 
pp.16-17), meanwhile in the U.S. discounts for “acceptance of responsibility” are also 
premised on a remorse rationale. Thus, while a Sentence Differential (especially a large 
differential) because an offender is remorseful is hard logically to justify in terms of 
penal principle, remorse does have some enduring appeal. 
 
B. The Victim Rationale 
 
Another rationale for Sentence Differentials asserts that this practice benefits victims of 
crime. In essence the rationale is based on the assumption that a victim will be best 
served by a guilty plea as this means that s/he will not be subjected to the trial process. 
Indeed, it is true that a trial can be an arduous ordeal for a victim that, inter alia, can 
require the victim to be cross-examined and have their integrity questioned – 
                                                 
 
10 Though some have argued that remorse can make an offender less blameworthy and 
therefore justify a (slightly but not significantly) lower sentence (see McCoy 2005, pp.79-82). 
11 There is a temporal element here in that this argument is premised on the harm and 
culpability being assessed at the time of the offence. While this arguably fits dominant penal 
principles, part of the reason for the appeal of remorse may relate to the fundamental 
nature of sentencing: judging a person (or more theologically a soul). In doing this there 
may be some appeal to judging the person as they currently stand and remorse (or 
repentance) may play a role in this (especially regarding whether they are “redeemable” or 
not). 
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potentially a difficult experience some victims may prefer to avoid (Dawes et al 2011, 
para 3.2).  
However, while sparing victims further ordeal may appear to be a kindness there are 
reasons to question to this rationale. One reason to object is that in many cases where a 
reduction is given there is no victim and the only witnesses are Police Officers. (Page 
2010, para 7.1.2). In these cases the victim rationale does not apply. Secondly, it is 
wrong to stereotype victims. Just as defendants’ circumstances vary, so do those of 
victims. These variations are significant as there are victims who are not well served by 
Sentence Discounting (Darbyshire 2000, p.905). For example, some victims may prefer 
a contested trial if this means they will learn more about the offence and the offender – 
which can help them obtain closure. Additionally, some victims may resent being 
“spared” for the simple reason that the cost of this “kindness” is that the defendant who 
wronged them receives a lesser sentence: though this risk must be weighed against the 
increased odds that an offender will not be convicted without a guilty plea. 
Thus, while “sparing” victims is a noble endeavour, these good intentions do not always 
have positive results. While the victim rationale seems plausible, it does not apply to 
many cases where a discount is given: as there is either no victim or the victim is not 
one who would benefit from being “spared”. Additionally, there is something troubling 
about the criminal process when it becomes so burdensome on victims that they need 
to be protected from it, potentially at the expense of penal principles. Indeed, Leverick 
has criticized the victim rationale for focusing attention on avoiding flawed criminal 
processes rather than improving them (Leverick 2004, p.374).  
A related drawback with the practice of not hearing from the victim at trial goes well 
beyond victim interests. It relates to the function of the criminal trial as a public 
communicative forum playing out the nature and limits of social mores. In this sense the 
trial is not something that is only for the disposal of cases concerning the interests of its 
immediate participants, but also serves as a forum for wider public discussion and 
debate. Through public displays of emotion, ritual and drama, the trial may demonstrate 
the polity’s commitment to justice. It plays an essential cathartic role for victims and the 
public which is increasingly encouraged to identify with “the victim” (Sparks 2011). In 
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so doing, in daily practice and especially high profile cases, the trial enables a moment 
of collective moral expiation which in turn helps to constitute a sense of community. In 
this way, the phenomenon of the vanishing trial not only silences the victims and 
defendants, but it also denies the ability to hear their stories publicly and for the law to 
show publicly that it has listened to them before coming to a decision. The decreased 
incidence of trials entails the loss of public displays of emotion, drama and ritual, in turn 
perpetuating a feeling that criminal justice has become a sterile automated process 
devoid of moral drama and meaning, an effect with tends to undermines public 
confidence in legitimacy of sentencing and the wider criminal justice system (Tait 
2002). 
 
C. The Efficiency Rationale 
 
The efficiency rationale is the prevailing basis on which the Sentence Differential is 
justified. In essence the argument typically put forward is that, while trials may be the 
ideal way to safeguard the presumption of innocence, resource constraints dictate that 
this ideal cannot be achieved in most cases. As a consequence, it is argued that it is 
necessary to incentivise guilty pleas (or at least earlier guilty pleas) with Sentence 
Discounts. Thus, the efficiency rationale is based on a claim of pragmatic necessity: 
inferring that without guilty pleas the system would collapse under the increased 
workload. Prima facia this argument is persuasive. If the justice system were to fail the 
consequences would be significant. Additionally, it is important to note that this 
argument, properly put, is not amoral. Since the justice system runs on public money 
there is a moral duty to ensure it is spent wisely. Thus, the efficiency rationale has a 
moral (utilitarian) foundation, based on an interpretation of “the greater good”.  
However, is this claim that Plea-Dependent Sentence Differentials save money factually 
accurate? While removing the Sentence Differential may result in fewer (and later) 
guilty pleas, it should again be remembered there are several other reasons why 
defendants plead guilty (Schulhofer 1984, p.1040; Feeley 1979). This means it should 
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not be assumed that all, or even most, guilty pleas are in fact the result of the Sentence 
Differential.   
Moreover, a number of commentators have suggested that the caseload necessity thesis 
is not as certain as may be assumed. For example, Weigend notes that it: 
Has little evidence to support it – the time and location of system changes from 
trial to non-trial adjudication are not related to significant increases in case input. 
This is especially true for countries where the introduction of bargained case 
dispositions did not result from overburdened courts’ search for an outlet but was 
the product of comprehensive legislative reform (Weigend 2006: 213). 
 
Indeed, from both international and historical perspectives the empirical link between 
the rise of the Sentence Differential (and plea bargaining more generally) and level of 
workload is at best tenuous (e.g. Eisenstein and Jacob 1977; Feeley 1979, 1982; 
Heumann 1975, 1978; Mather 1979; Vogel 2007).12 By comparing low and high court 
volumes and across time, it has been found that remarkably similar proportions of cases 
result in a guilty plea. McCoy sums up the point neatly:  
The finding that a high percentage of cases conclude with guilty pleas even when 
there is very little caseload pressure undermines the conventional wisdom that 
explains plea bargaining in terms of efficiency (McCoy 1983: 59).  
Ironically, the expectation, encouraged by the high profile of the Sentence Differential, 
that cases will invariably settle by way of guilty pleas or be dropped can itself lead to 
wasteful “churn” and delay in court hearings. For example, prosecutors may tend to be 
more improvident in how they libel charges than they would if they expected a trial, in 
the partial expectation that those charges will later become useful bargaining chips 
(Caldwell 2011: 65). Defence lawyers may respond to this by delaying settlement until 
                                                 
 
12 Though it has been suggested that, even if changes in criminal workloads were not 
related, changing civil workloads may have placed pressure on the courts (McCoy 2005, 
p.77). 
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trial, which may be “the best time to put on the screws”13 and get a better deal from a 
pressured prosecutor.  
Indeed, in part because of the environment propagated by expectations of Sentence 
Discounting, prosecutors and defence lawyers tend to avoid a thorough examination of 
the evidence at the earliest opportunity in the expectation of settlement later in the 
process or withdrawal of the case (Tata and Stephen 2008; Bradshaw et al 2012, para 
6.14). This, of course, is self-perpetuating: all of this leads to a lack of preparedness and 
an “adjournments culture” (Kemp 2008), which from the perspective of individual 
practitioners is rational and prudent, but from a system wide perspective is inefficient. 
Thus, the Sentence Differential may work to normalize an inefficient culture and 
contribute to “phenomena aimed at delaying the progress of cases” (McInnes 2004, 
chapter 28).14  
Additionally, there can be a tendency to assume that processes encouraging guilty pleas 
cost nothing. However, while such costs may be hard to quantify they do exist and it is 
incorrect to assume that they are “trivial” (Schulhofer 1984, p.1040). For example, 
guilty pleas may be seen as saving resources, but in reality there are costs as lawyers 
may have to spend time persuading defendants to plead guilty. Furthermore, even 
seemingly minor delays related to guilty pleas have consequences (these delays may be 
the result of “cracked trials”15, or, the delay resulting from cases unexpectedly going to 
trial). Schulhofer has noted that in his sample various delays meant that the average 
case involved 35 minutes of waiting, and the “average guilty plea proceeding in fact 
required 55 minutes of courtroom time for the conviction stage alone” (Schulhofer 
1984, pp.1056-1057). While these figures do not take account of the entirety of the 
potential culture of inefficiency that results from practices designed to promote guilty 
pleas, they do suggest that the costs might be more significant than is generally 
                                                 
 
13 Tata (2007), p.512. 
14 Also see Bradshaw et al 2012, para 6.14 (this discusses reasons to delay a guilty plea). 
15 “Cracked Trials” refer to the situation where a defendant pleads guilty shortly before 
or during a trial, or where the prosecution offers no evidence. They are widely regarded 
as undesirable and a waste of the resources. 
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assumed. Moreover, it is worth noting that even if the removal of the perception of a 
Sentence Differential did increase the workload of the justice system, it might adapt 
rather than simply grind to a halt. Some have suggested that a simplified trial procedure 
could be used, while others have argued that a total ban on Guilty Plea Discounts may be 
unsustainable but a partial ban could work (Schulhofer 1984; Alschuler 1983; Gazal 
2005). Thus, while the necessity argument cannot be dispelled completely, equally, it 
should not automatically be taken as true.  
Finally, the widely-cited concept of “efficiency” bears scrutiny. Efficiency is, of course, a 
laudable goal with which no one can reasonably disagree. However, implicit in the 
debate about the Sentencing Differential is profound disagreement about what counts 
as “efficient”. Measuring “efficiency” in the justice system is not a value-free exercise. It 
implies normative claims about what is “just”, what is “necessary” and what is 
“wasteful” based on different and competing perspectives about the “correct” role of 
prosecution, defence, judge and indeed the justice of the criminal process as a whole 
(Tata 2007). It is easy to imagine that “efficiency” is about doing things more 
productively. The prevailing image is the factory assembly line. More production of the 
desired output from no more input (e.g. labour, outlay) equals greater productivity. 
When the output is shoes or widgets it is fairly clear and easy to measure. Yet, what 
should be the desired output of criminal justice? Is it the sheer number of cases 
processed? Surely, the output of a justice system must be justice. Therefore, an increase 
in case disposals which largely results in injustice is, by definition, self-defeating and 
therefore inefficient. In other words, when even the cheapest justice system produces 
injustice it fails to be efficient. To take an analogy, you can drive quickly but it cannot be 
efficient unless you are actually heading to your destination. In the same way injustice 
can only ever be a mark of inefficiency: the system has failed to produce what it should. 
In other words, logically, it cannot be enough to justify the Sentence Differential on the 
grounds of cost alone. This is not to deny that the Sentence Differential may dispose of 
cases in a way that also dispenses justice, but the link between the two cannot be 
assumed: it is tenuous and contingent.  
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IV. How Big is the Sentence Differential? 
 
The concept of a sentence reduction resulting from a guilty plea (or its functional 
equivalent) is well known. Even inquisitorial jurisdictions understand the concept of 
negotiated justice and many systematically reward “confessions” through practices 
somewhat akin to “Plea Bargaining” (Rauxloh (2010) and Langer (2004)). However, a 
concept is not the same as the empirical reality of a practice. Consequently, this section 
focuses on the empirical questions regarding the Sentence Differential. In particular, the 
section aims to highlight that the reality of the Sentence Differential may not be as is 
commonly assumed, and that there can even be debate over whether there is a sentence 
differential. This is done by highlighting some of the difficulties defining and measuring 
the sentence differential and some research that may challenge certain assumptions. 
At first glance this empirical question may seem strange given that it is often suggested 
(in case law, statues, or guidelines depending on the jurisdiction) that Guilty Pleas result 
in a lower sentence, and that defendants may believe and be told they received a 
“discount”. However, just because the law suggests there should be a discount, and 
because defendants believe there is a discount, does not necessarily mean that this is in 
fact the case. Nor does it assuage concerns that sentences may be inflated prior to the 
application of a discount in order to negate the effect of any apparent reduction 
(Chalmers et al (2007), para 6.26). Thus, the empirical evidence needs to be scrutinised. 
However, empirically verifying whether or not the Sentence Differential materialises is 
not a simple task. The first issue is conceptual. It is crucial that empirical studies are 
clear about exactly what is, (and is not), being examined empirically . For example, in 
United States Federal cases, Andrew Kim notes that some studies exclude the 
“acceptance of responsibility” discount for a guilty plea while others do not (Kim 2015, 
p.1200). Given that this “acceptance of responsibility” feature can significantly reduce a 
sentence, (Kim suggests by between 25% to 35%), its the inclusion or exclusion should 
be noted. . Similarly, other differences between prima facia similar studies can result in 
each measuring something different under the same or similar headings.  Abrams sets 
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out what he means by the term “trial tax”, though this definition is not universally 
employed by all researchers. (This does not, of course, make Abrams or any other 
researcher wrong, but what it does underline is that to a considerable extent what (and 
how) researchers study is also driven by their normative values and beliefs about 
justice.  The second issue is the ability to identify and quantify any Sentence Differential. 
This requires a means of comparing otherwise equal cohorts of cases where the only 
variation is plea. To achieve this comparison demands a way of conceiving and 
representing the sentencing decision-making process (Tata 1997; 2007). How to 
understand and measure the exercise of discretionary decision-making is widely 
debated. For instance, should one take a behaviourist perspective in which certain 
stimuli (factors, variables) are thought to illicit predictable responses in the decision-
maker? If so, even before one comes to measure the impact of factors, one first has to 
identify what does and does not count as a factor. On the other hand, should one take an 
interpretive approach to understand naturalistically how decision-makers interpret the 
cases before them (Hawkins 1992; Tata 2007)? If so, is it ever possible to quantify 
definitively what impact a guilty plea has on sentence? Arguably, both approaches are in 
fact justifiable and judges themselves operate and flip between behaviourist and 
interpretive idioms. Thus, it would be sensible to research the sentence differential 
using both approaches.  
One possible way to explore the Sentence Differential is to simply ask sentencers what 
effect a guilty plea has had. For example, some jurisdictions require sentencers to state 
openly in court what, if any, Guilty Plea Discount has been applied. This information can 
be used for research such as that by Wren and Bartels (2015). While the particulars of 
the methodology are beyond the scope of this essay, it suffices to note that the research 
analysed “300 decisions handed down by the [Australian Capital Territory] Supreme 
Court” (Wren and Bartels 2015, p.372). Using these decisions allowed Wren and Bartels 
to compare the stated pre-discount sentence with the actual sentence imposed to shed 
some light on how Guilty Plea Discounts were operationalized in these cases (Wren and 
Bartels 2015, p.372). However, while this method provided empirical evidence of a 
Sentence Discount, it depends on the pre-discount sentence being correctly reported. 
This is potentially problematic for a number of reasons. For example, can sentencers 
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always isolate and quantify the effect of a guilty plea accurately? Alternatively, might 
the stated pre-discount sentence have been altered (even subconsciously) to negate, 
reduce or increase any apparent Sentence Differential?  
It might be thought that the issue can be easily determined through the use of 
guidelines that specify starting points and the required Sentence Differential. Yet, even 
relatively juridified and precise guidelines (in jurisdictions were these operate) may not 
be precise enough to allow empirical verification of Guilty Plea Discounts. For example, 
even the relatively stringent pre-Booker U.S. Federal Guidelines (pre-Booker (United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) have only had a qualified success in curtailing 
judicial discretion in sentencing as they still leave room for “judicial resistance to 
policies deemed legal, but unjust” (Provine 1998, p.825). Moreover, curtailing judicial 
discretion may displace discretion to prosecutors who now have “greater bargaining 
power concerning charge, plea, and sentence” (Hodgson and Roberts 2010, pp.81). 
Thus, even in what appear to be highly regulated sentencing systems it is still wise to be 
cautious about making assumptions regarding the Sentence Differential. Indeed, Tonry 
has noted that while Washington State has come closest: “no jurisdiction has as yet 
devised an adequate system for controlling plea bargaining under a sentencing 
guidelines system” (Tonry 1996, p.67). 
Another way to explore the Sentence Differential is to compare guilty plea cases and not 
guilty plea cases using statistical techniques such as logistic regression, et cetera. The 
details of these methods are beyond the scope of this essay, but the results of some 
studies are worth noting. Many of these studies focus on the United States and, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, several support the idea that the Sentence Differential is substantial (e.g. 
King et al 2005; Kim 2015, McCoy 2005: 88-91). Yet, interestingly not all research 
supports the notion that there is a large Sentence Differential. 
David Abrams' work is one such piece. Abrams explores whether the “Trial Penalty” 
exists using data from Cook County, Illinois. The study compares cases where there was 
a guilty plea with comparable cases where there was no guilty plea. The study is notable 
for its suggestion that the “Trial Penalty” may not exist and that defendants may 
actually fare better by pleading not guilty and going to trial (Abrams 2011, 2013). This 
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suggestion runs contrary to what many intuitively believe and consequently garnered 
some attention, and criticism (Alschuler 2013, p.687; Kim 2015). Whether these 
criticisms should be accepted is a difficult question and beyond the scope of this essay: 
the aim here is merely to highlight that assumptions regarding the Sentence Differential 
may be open to challenge.  
 
However, it should be pointed out that Abrams’ study is a poignant example of why it is 
crucial to be clear what a particular study is measuring. As suggested above the 
Sentence Differential and Trial Penalty can be understood to mean different things. In 
Abrams’ study he takes the “Trial Penalty” to include the odds of non-conviction. As Kim 
eloquently puts it: ““Abrams’ Trial Penalty” = (trial sentence) × (odds of conviction) – 
plea sentence” (Kim 2015, p.1217). Thus, Abrams is aiming to measure overall case 
outcomes, (including whether or not there is a custodial sentence), and not just sentence 
outcomes. 
While definitions are open to debate and not all agree with Abrams’ definition of the 
Trial Penalty (Abrams’ argues it is correct as in any trial there is a “substantial 
likelihood that a person charged may not be convicted” (Abrams 2013, p.779)) the 
important thing is to be clear as to the definitions used in a particular study. However, 
these caveats aside, the apparent lack of an Abrams’ Sentence Differential could be 
considered troubling. It suggests widely held perceptions that defendants will benefit 
from more lenient treatment by pleading guilty may (all else being equal) be 
exaggerated: though of course this definition of benefit does not account for the 
burdens an accused may face if going to trial. 
Outside of the United States another notable study worth mention is that by Goriely et al 
(2001; Tata et al 2004). This was a large-scale study of Scottish summary (non-jury) 
cases that focused on overall case outcomes (including the chances of conviction and 
sentencing outcomes). The study sought to compare the performance in otherwise 
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similar cases of two types of defence lawyers working for legally aided clients.17 By 
gathering data directly from the courts, the study compared the impact and timing of 
guilty pleas with cases where the accused pled not guilty on case outcomes. The study 
found that (with the exception of sex offence cases) generally speaking the widely 
perceived reductions for guilty pleas did not materialize. It also suggested that there 
might be some benefit to pleading not guilty. 
Much popular and policy discourse focuses on the problem of “late” guilty pleas and the 
waste of time and resources where defendants plead guilty shortly before trial. It is 
often said that some defendants simply put off the inevitable “evil day” by continuing to 
deny their guilt until the trial (e.g. Pleasence and Quirk 2001 para 4.10.7). Yet, aside 
from whether or not a defendant may believe himself or herself to be guilty of the 
charges, there can be sound tactical reasons for maintaining a not guilty plea for as long 
as possible. For example, Goriely et al found that the chances of non-conviction rose 
markedly when prosecutors really had to examine the strength of their case: 
The longer a case proceeds the more the likely the [prosecution] is to abandon it. 
While only 2% of cases were abandoned at the first hearing, 47% of cases resulted 
in a not guilty outcome18 after trial evidence was led. Other things being equal, an 
accused’s best means of avoiding a conviction is to maintain a not guilty plea at 
least until the morning of the trial and preferably beyond. The chance that the 
prosecution case will fold is small but real, and contrasts with the certainty of 
conviction if one pleads guilty (Goriely et al 2001: 97-98).  
Consequently, it may be that not pleading guilty might be more advantageous than is 
sometimes suggested by the widely held idea of a large Sentence Differential. This issue 
                                                 
 
17 The comparison was between lawyers working in private firms who collect legal aid 
payments on a case-by-case basis and those directly employed by the legal aid board 
paid an annual salary. Note that both types of lawyers defend legally aided “indigent” 
clients (i.e. not private paying clients who are relatively rare in Scottish criminal cases).  
18 “Not guilty outcomes” included not guilty, not proven verdicts, and cases dismissed 
after findings of no case to answer. 
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could be particularly marked if it means that some defendants are pleading guilty in the 
false belief that there is a Sentence Differential. However, it is vital to note that 
statistical odds are not the same as the perceptions of defendants or indeed their 
experiences of the criminal justice system. The extent to which one is prepared to take 
the risk of pleading not guilty until trial and beyond depends, all else being equal, for 
example, on personal attitude to risk (in the context of personal circumstances) and 
trust in the fairness of the system. While some defendants are prepared to take the risk 
of going to trial others are keen to get a case over with, especially if they appear from 
police custody or have been held in pre-trial detention (Stephen and Tata 2006). 
Research has repeatedly suggested that while the pre-trial is not explicitly punitive, it 
tends to be experienced as such by many defendants (e.g. Feeley 1979; Wong 2012):  
It is the cost of being caught up in the criminal justice system itself that is often 
most bothersome to defendants accused of petty offences, and it is this cost which 
shapes their subsequent course of action once they are entrapped by the system…. 
In essence, the process itself is the punishment. The time, effort, money and 
opportunities lost as a direct result of being caught up in the system can quickly 
come to outweigh the penalty that issues from adjudication and sentence (Feeley 
1979: 30-31). 
The stress and uncertainty of the pre-trial process, not to mention physical deprivations 
of pre-trial detention and bail controls, mean that even if the prosecution case is 
thought to be weak, for many defendants a guilty plea is a prudent, (even if 
disingenuous), decision. Consequently, “there is a real concern that defendants plead 
guilty to crimes that they may not have committed or should not be found to be legally 
at fault” (Wong 2013: 271). 
 
 
V. Some Further Questions 
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So far the essay has covered some of the fundamental issues relating to the Plea-
Dependent Sentence Differential. However, this section briefly highlights some further 
questions and issues that follow on from the fundamentals. The most obvious question 
to be asked regards the empirical nature and extent of the Sentence Differential.  
 
A. The Quality of Sentencing Data 
Here we confront an immediate problem: the deficient quality of data on which most 
sentencing research has to rely. To be able to quantify and measure Sentence 
Differentials depends on the ability to analyse sentencing data in a meaningful way. To 
isolate the impact of plea on sentence, research has to control for all other relevant 
sentencing information. The problem is that very often that information is of dubious 
quality.  
For understandable reasons of convenience, resources, and access, most sentencing 
research (by official bodies and academic research) relies on official data sets. However, 
in many countries official data tends to be recorded for a variety of official purposes 
other than sentencing and so, from the perspective of sentencing, tends to be limited.  
Critical to the measurement of Sentencing Differentials is the ability to control for 
information other than the plea. So, for example, how should research conceive of and 
measure offence seriousness? Most official data tend to have limited information about 
the seriousness of convictions. To take just one example, official data tend to focus 
mainly on recording what is deemed, (often somewhat arbitrarily by a non-judicial 
agency), to be the principal conviction, rendering other serious convictions as sub-
convictions, about which little may be known if they are even recorded. The result of 
this is that the seriousness of multi- and single-conviction cases are insufficiently 
distinguished, thus undermining the ability to make valid comparisons between cases. 
(Tata 1997).  There are two obvious solutions to this issue, though neither is easy. The 
first is that the quality of official data collected about sentencing needs to be improved 
markedly. The second is that where researchers are unable to gain access to data which 
allows for genuinely meaningful analyses about case seriousness, et cetera it will be 
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necessary to collect their own data: this of course is time-consuming and challenging 
but the quality of sentencing information tends to be far more satisfactory. 
 
B. Research into Defendants’ Views and Perspectives 
A second area which requires much closer research is defendants’ views and 
perspectives about the Sentence Differential. Most of the research which has been 
conducted examines the views and practices of defence lawyers, prosecutors, and, to a 
lesser extent, judges. Yet, we know remarkably little about the perspectives of 
defendants. Much of what we think we know is derived from the views and assumptions 
of practitioners. We need to know more from defendants themselves and indeed the 
extent to which their interpretations and perspectives are shared by practitioners. How 
plea is decision-making approached and interpreted by defendants? How does it 
connect with their life contexts and previous encounters with the justice system? Do 
defendants consider the Sentence Differential to be a discount or a penalty? How do 
they understand the meaning of guilt in the particular context of their case? What 
impact do their perceptions about their treatment (including as to how to plead) play 
into wider views of the justice system and authority? How might a sense of processual 
fairness assist (or exacerbate) the desistance journey away from offending? For 
example, it was already suggested that a guilty plea does not necessarily indicate 
remorse. However, even if this is true it may be that the defendant nevertheless comes 
to internalise some aspect of the guilty plea. In the case of white-collar offenders, it has 
been suggested that “acceptance or rejection of guilt has an impact upon the process of 
desistance at various stages” (Hunter 2015 p.182).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay has explored the issues and questions surrounding the Sentence Differential 
that is perceived to exist in most Western Jurisdictions. First the essay discussed the 
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argument that the Sentence Differential violates the Presumption of Innocence, 
sometimes called a “Trial Tax” or “Trial Penalty” by opponents. This concern was 
explored in two parts.  
Part I explored the philosophical nature of what constitutes a reward and what 
constitutes a discount. While there are valid arguments on both sides, and the matter is 
open to interpretation, here it was highlighted that since most defendants plead guilty 
the “discounted” sentence is actually the one most commonly paid. Accordingly, it could 
make more sense to consider the post-discount sentence as the baseline. However, 
while this has advantages, it was also recognised that it is normatively problematic as it 
would mean that sentences following a trial are increased. This, rather ungainly 
situation, raises the question of whether the Sentence Differential deters defendants 
from going to trial thus and compromising the presumption of innocence. 
Part II explored the criticism that the Sentence Differential may have a disparate impact 
on certain groups, such as minorities. It was argued that, by nature, a Sentence 
Differential that favours guilty pleas (or disadvantages not guilty pleas) means that 
those pleading not guilty will fare worse. This is problematic since some groups appear 
less likely to plead guilty. This section concluded that it was likely that the Sentence 
Differential contribute to disparate sentencing outcomes. 
 
 
Part III of the essay explored why, considering all the criticism and controversy, some 
justice systems allow the Sentence Differential to continue and others actually seek to 
encourage and bolster it. To this end three main rationales are discussed: the remorse 
rationale, the victim rationale, and the efficiency rationale. All three were found to be 
limited, but each has its appeal. Of the three, the efficiency rationale is generally 
considered dominant in legal discourse. However, this paper argues that for the 
Sentence Differential to be efficient it must produce justice otherwise it cannot, no 
matter how many trials it avoids, be considered efficient. The essay also questioned 
whether the Sentence Differential, and other practices related to securing guilty pleas, 
actually save resources, or whether there is in fact adaptive behaviour and a 
consequential culture of delay. 
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Penultimately, Part IV explored the quantitative question of whether there is an 
empirically verifiable Sentence Differential. The essay outlined some of the difficulties 
that make empirical work on sentencing difficult. In particular, it noted that there are 
tricky conceptual issues to be wary of, especially as seemingly similar research may 
measure different things. However, while there is research supporting the common 
assumptions regarding the Sentence Differential, the essay also highlighted research 
that provides reason to question these assumptions. The essay also noted that while the 
lack of Sentence Differential might have advantages, if it were absent it might mean 
defendants are pleading guilty on an incorrect basis.  
 
Part V of the essay raised some further questions regarding the Sentence Differential. 
This focused on what further questions can be asked about the practice and where 
future research might focus. It was suggested that more needs to be learnt about the 
empirical reality of the Sentence Differential. It also argued that greater effort needs to 
be made to research the perspective of defendants, rather than simply reading-off their 
thinking from the accounts of practitioners.  
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